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Abstract: Bernard Mandeville was not alone in criticising the charity 
school movement that had developed in Britain starting in late 1600; yet 
his Essay on charity and charity-schools is extremely provocative, 
especially as it regards the conditions of the poor. He criticises the 
selfish intentions and motives of charity schools, and inquires whether 
such schools are socially advantageous. This essay aims, first, to shed 
light on Mandeville’s views on charity and charity schools, and 
demonstrate that such views are consistent with his moral thought. 
Second, this essay addresses problems inherent in Mandeville’s views on 
how the working poor should be “managed”; what he proposes does not 
appear to guarantee (but rather puts at further risk) societal peace or 
the happiness of poor people.  
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INTRODUCTION 
It used to be widely believed that Bernard Mandeville was not concerned 
about the poor.1 In truth, there is nothing to suggest that he was not a 
compassionate man either in his private life or in his profession as a 
                                                
1 It used to be that Mandeville’s attitude toward the poor was described as “grim 
mercantilist”, which depicted him as a harsh advocate of the utility of poverty 
(Wittkowsky 1943, 79; Heckscher 1956; Moss 1987). However, recent assessments of 
Mandeville’s mercantilist background have taken a more nuanced view regarding his 
attitude towards the poor (Hurtado-Prieto 2006). For a balanced analysis of 
Mandeville’s Augustinian and mercantilist background, see Dew (2013); Dew (2005); 
Brody Kramnick (1992). On the political aspects of poverty, see Gunn (1983). For a 
discussion about Mandeville’s account of social progress, see Jack (1989). 
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medical doctor. He worked with the poor and witnessed, first hand, the 
grim realities of life on the streets. Likewise, his work addressed 
problems facing marginalized peoples and offered solutions to those 
problems. For example, he adopted a strong stance against domestic 
violence towards women, which is discussed in Virgin unmasked 
(Mandeville 1999); he has used female characters in several of his 
dialogues; he even provided ideas on how to improve the conditions of 
working girls.2 In his medical practice he advocated for simple methods, 
and above all offered psychological help to the sick. He seemed to 
genuinely despise coffee-shop doctors who cashed in on quack pills. The 
reality of the living and working conditions of the poor, among other 
things, could have fostered his resentment of hypocrisy, which he set 
out to expose by means of paradoxical writing in his Fable of the bees 
(Mandeville 1924a) as well as in his treatment of Shaftesbury (who was 
seen to project his own privileged position onto the whole of human 
kind).3 Nevertheless, although Mandeville acquired many of his views 
about human nature through his involvement with the immigrant 
population and working class, it should be noted that this constituted 
only one context of his experiences. By contrast, the most puzzling of 
his works is his Essay on charity and charity-schools (Mandeville 1924b), 
which dealt with a much debated and delicate issue of the time: poor 
people and the so-called “charity schools” where impoverished children 
were sent to receive a basic education, as an alternative to early 
employment.  
Mandeville was not alone in criticising the charity school movement 
that had developed in Britain since late seventeenth century, yet his 
Essay on charity and charity-schools seems extremely provocative with 
regard to the conditions of the poor.4 Indeed, there are many passages 
in the essay that convey an apparently unmotivated ruthlessness.  
What can be said is that Mandeville seemed, generally, to make an 
effort to reconcile his views about such institutions with his moral 
thought; that is, his premises were motivated from the perspective of an 
objective morality (i.e., morality that is not concerned with appearance), 
in order to validate his arguments. Yet, his efforts to do so fell short at 
times: first, his attempt at reconciling his views with objective morality 
                                                
2 See Garrett. 
3 About Mandeville’s relationship towards Shaftesbury, see Tolonen (2013, 32-34 and 
68-69) and Tolonen (2015).  
4 For other contemporary discussions on charity schools, see for example, Defoe 
(1859), p. 14; Locke (1997); Berkeley (1948-1957, VI). 
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was not convincing and thus not successful. Second, his portrayal of 
poor people was at odds with his own view of human nature, as if the 
poor belonged to a different species than human. 
The aim of the paper is as follows: first, to shed light on Mandeville’s 
views on charity and charity schools by going beyond the ‘utility of 
poverty’ discussion in order to show that such views are consistent with 
his general line thought: his criticisms of charity apply to the intentions 
that motivate charitable acts. In his texts Mandeville puts forward a view 
that claims that true morality is always and necessarily generated by 
self-denial, whereas charity and its “product”—i.e., the charity schools—
are not. Self-denial is used as a premise for a moral position, upon 
which he evaluated the acts of those who claimed to be charitable. The 
argument he put forward purports to show that charity schools are not 
motivated by genuine consideration of what is good for society, or for 
the poor themselves. Rather, charity schools put at risk societal peace 
and order, the wealth of the country and, ultimately, the happiness of 
the poor.  
Second, the paper shifts focus in order to address the problems 
inherent in Mandeville’s views of how the working poor should be 
“managed”: what he proposes does not appear to guarantee (but rather 
puts at further risk) societal peace as well as the happiness of poor 
people. Mandeville’s seemingly unconvincing and inconsistent 
arguments are analysed. Specific attention is given to his claim that the 
working poor ought to be kept in a state of poverty, and to his “portrait” 
of the poor, which portrays them as people with different passions and 
different needs—as if ultimately they have a different nature. An 
extensive discussion is dedicated to the claim that ignorance is the key 
to preserving poor people’s happiness. It will subsequently be shown 
that Mandeville’s claims are often contradictory and philosophically 
unsatisfying.  
 
I. MANDEVILLE’S CRITICISM OF CHARITY-SCHOOLS: HYPOCRISY OF 
MOTIVES, USEFULNESS OF RESULTS 
Mandeville’s attack on charity schools was primarily meant as an attack 
on the hypocrisy of their founders, who pretended to be motivated by 
what is often referred to as the virtue of charity. At the same time, it 
could have reflected Mandeville’s resentment of utopian projects built 
on self-deception with the tendency to do more harm than good. In 
moral terms, his analysis of charity in his Essay on charity and charity-
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schools was similar to his reflections on every other simulated virtue. A 
pure act of charity implies a form of self-denial, but Mandeville 
expressed extreme scepticism about identifying genuinely altruistic 
action. In fact, he argued that what is commonly regarded as charity 
tends to have nothing to do with virtue. The most common charitable 
actions arise from a mixture of pity and pride. Pity is a natural passion 
that arises upon the sight of someone suffering, especially when the 
senses perceive the pain of others. Helping to relieve suffering 
engenders a feeling of pride (Mandeville 1924b, 258). Vanity also plays a 
role in motivating charitable actions: people simulate charity in order to 
gain a good reputation (1924b, 261). Mandeville mentions the case of 
John Radcliffe, a rich doctor who ignored his immediate family and left 
a substantial part of his fortune to the University of Oxford, where he 
knew he would be remembered long after his death (1924b, 261). People 
are also disposed to donate goods to the poor to ensure deliverance 
from their sins. This kind of charity, which is motivated by selfish 
concerns, is hypocritical.  
Mandeville criticised insincere charity, arguing against the hypocrisy 
charity schools: they are the consequence of human passions, not pure 
benevolence or altruism (1924b, 285). What disturbed him most is the 
hypocrisy that leads to their construction and the universal enthusiasm 
for them. However, a simple consideration of human nature would 
explain why the majority of people are so fond of charity schools: they 
give their supporters an opportunity to feel morally superior, offering 
redemption for their sins (1924b, 279). People will, of course, claim that 
the pleasure they experience in contributing to the common good 
motivated them, but once again, their alleged motives are very different 
from their real ones. According to Mandeville, “No Habit or Quality is 
more easily acquir’d than Hypocrisy, nor anything sooner learn’d than to 
deny the Sentiments of our Hearts and the Principle we act from” 
(1924b, 281). Moreover, a stronger reason for criticism, in addition to 
the motives discussed above, is that charity schools are not socially 
beneficial; they may even be detrimental to civil society.  
 
Risks raised by charity schools: crime, unemployment, unhappiness 
Mandeville began by analysing the outcomes of charity schools from the 
perspective of public interest. Referring to the social order, he argued 
that, despite what their supporters claim the schools do not reduce the 
number of criminals, and thus he downplayed the relationship between 
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ignorance and crime. There were other reasons why thefts, burglaries, 
and murders were committed, the prime example being that the laws 
were not strict enough and that it was too easy to escape punishment. If 
the justice system were more severe, there would be far fewer criminals 
because the fear of punishment would deter them (Mandeville 1924b, 
273). Charity schools might have even contributed to criminality, as 
Mandeville was convinced that another primary cause of crime is “the 
habit of Sloth, Idleness and strong Aversion to Labour and Assiduity” 
(1924b, 274), which charity schools may have encouraged, concluding 
that “it is not the want of Reading and Writing, but the concurrence and 
a complication of more substantial Evils that are the perpetual Nursery 
of abandoned Profligates in great and opulent Nations” (1924b, 275). 
Mandeville also extensively analysed the outcomes of charity schools 
for their supposed beneficiaries—poor people. Again, he was not 
satisfied with what such schools achieved, which he summarised in two 
words: unemployment and unhappiness. The education in charity 
schools failed to achieve the main objective of every genuine 
educational institution: to help children find jobs after they finish their 
schooling. Mandeville was a strong supporter of practical education that 
directed one toward a specific line of work, while he was against the 
kind of non-tangible education given in charity schools, which did not 
teach any competence and risked to produce a generation of young 
adults who cannot find a job and consequently a decent position in 
society, and end up begging.  
Mandeville’s attack on what he considered to be unnecessary 
education of poor children is primarily pragmatic:  
 
Reading, writing and arithmetick, are very necessary to those, whose 
business require such qualifications, but where people’s livelihood 
has no dependence on these arts, they are very pernicious to the 
poor, who are forc’d to get their daily bread by their daily labour 
(1924b, 288). 
 
The kind of education provided by charity schools could instead 
encourage laziness, and it would be much better to teach poor children 
a job and to send them to work at as early an age as possible (1924b, 
267).  
Employment is a crucial issue for Mandeville. He argues that, when it 
comes to “the social design of promoting arts and sciences”, the 
“principal aim” of these undertakings “is the Employment of the Poor” 
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(Mandeville 1733, 43), and that, “Employments might be found out for 
most our Lame, and many that are unfit for hard Labour, as well as the 
Blind, as long as their Health and Strength would allow of it” (Mandeville 
1924b, 267-268). Charity schools were simply not the right means to 
provide employment.  
Another major problem for charity schools, in addition to 
unemployment and its consequent social exclusion, was unhappiness. 
Given the kind of education provided, the children of the poor became 
aware of the existence of “another world” in which low wages, good 
beer, and simple clothes are not enough. Mandeville’s claim that poor 
people should be kept ignorant rests on the fact that “it is impossible, 
that any Creature should know the Want of what it can have no Idea of” 
(Mandeville 1733, 285). To some extent, those who have never 
experienced certain comforts, and do not have the faintest idea about 
them, cannot really desire them strongly, and thus, do not suffer as 
much from their absence: it is much easier for the poor to accept their 
condition if they have never known an easier or better life than it is for 
the rich to give up privileges and habits to which they are habituated. He 
argued that… 
 
Hard Labour and the coarsest Diet are a proper Punishment to 
several kinds of Malefactors, but to impose either on those that have 
not been used and brought up to both is the greatest Cruelty, when 
there is no Crime you can charge them with (Mandeville 1924b, 288-
289), … 
 
and that since “Abundance of hard and dirty Labour is to be done […] 
the things I called Hardships, neither seem nor are such to those who 
have been brought up to ’em, and know no better” (1924b, 311). 
For this reason Mandeville believed that a farmer, who had always 
lived a simple life full of hard work in the countryside, will not suffer 
because he does not have silk clothes or elegant furniture. This idea 
resembles what is now called the “endowment effect”—i.e., having or 
enjoying something and then losing it brings about much more 
suffering than never having experienced or possessed it (Thaler 1980). 
For this reason, one who is used to a comfortable life would hardly 
accept to be deprived of it and to work hard, while one who has never 
experienced anything different will adapt to it easily. Mandeville was 
convinced that children who were educated at charity schools, having 
become used to study rather than to work, would not submit to hard 
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labour; and further, without having proper alternatives, those children 
would end up unhappy and unemployed, and likely would engage in 
criminality. 
 
Mercantilist arguments 
It is evident that Mandeville’s ideas for maintaining a rich and 
flourishing nation were influenced by his mercantilist background (see 
Furniss 1920, 117). He argues that, … 
 
[t]he surest Wealth consists in a Multitude of laborious Poor; for 
besides that they are the never-failing Nursery of Fleets and Armies, 
without them there could be no Enjoyment, and no Product of any 
Country could be valuable (Mandeville 1924b, 287).  
 
His point was that the wealth of a nation depends upon the poor 
working class: a certain quantity of poor people is required to do work 
that no one (the rich) would do. For this reason, it is hypocritical to 
praise charity schools without acknowledging the need of a poor 
working class. As the wealth of a particular nation, according to 
Mandeville, depends partly upon the poor working class, it is 
hypocritical to praise supposed means to get rid of ignorant poor and at 
the same time to enjoy the benefits of having a lot of poor people 
willing to work hard. This kind of hypocrisy was prevalent among those 
people who complained about the dangers of vice, yet enjoyed all the 
“public benefits” that arise from it; similarly, the same hypocrisy was 
prevalent among people who complained about London’s dirty, stinking 
streets, but whose wealth depended on the trade, commerce, and other 
activities that took place on the streets. These activities contributed not 
only to the chaos of the streets, but also to the wealth and opulence of 
the city (Mandeville 1924a, 12). 
In addition to pragmatic considerations, Mandeville argued for the 
economic need to keep workers poor. He believed that by keeping wages 
low among the poor, England could be competitive on an international 
level as the price of manufactures could have been kept low as well. He 
suggests that the poor should be paid according to their productivity as 
opposed to receiving a set weekly or monthly wage.5 What a “labouring 
                                                
5 In the Fables part II he writes: “Lucre is the best Restorative in the World, in a literal 
Sense, and works upon the Spirits mechanically; for it is not only a Spur, that excites 
Men to labour, and makes them in love with it; but it likewise gives Relief in Weariness, 
and actually supports Men in all Fatigues and Difficulties. A Labourer of any sort, who 
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man” needs is “a moderate quantity of money; for as too little will either 
dispirit or make him desperate, so too much will make him insolent and 
lazy” (Mandeville 1924b, 194). Further, “The Proportion of the Society is 
spoil’d [if] the Bulk of the Nation [does not] consist of Labouring Poor, 
that are unacquainted with every thing but their Work” (1924b, 302). He 
therefore suggested that the greater the number of people working for 
low wages in a nation, the richer it will become. This is clearly a 
mercantile claim.  
Adam Smith, and later Karl Marx, specifically criticized the 
mercantilist paradox (supported by Mandeville) that what makes a 
nation rich is its number of working poor. Marx pointed out that not 
only does having a multitude of poor people prohibit a nation from 
becoming rich, but that it is also dangerous as it puts social order at risk 
(Marx 1964, 643). 
 
II. UNCONVINCING ARGUMENTS AND INCONSISTENCIES 
Thus far the focus of this paper has been on Mandeville’s views about 
charity schools. The aim has been to identify consistent arguments 
within his work and with the shared opinion of his time. However, most 
of what Mandeville wrote in his essay Charity-schools seems much less 
reasonable and not ‘Mandevillian’ at all. Rather, it reads as if he wanted 
to prove his point about the uselessness and perniciousness of charity 
schools, and cared less whether his arguments were theoretically 
suspect. It appears that he did not attempt to reconcile his views on 
charity schools with his other, perhaps more profound, views on human 
nature. 
 
A perennial state of necessity: incompatible with human passions, 
dangerous for social order? 
When Mandeville argues that workers need to be kept poor, his primary 
reason is the economic consideration examined above. He provided, 
however, a secondary reason—viz., that workers should be kept poor so 
that they find it necessary to work:  
 
The absolute necessity all stand in for Victuals and Drink, and in 
cold Climates for Clothes and Lodging, makes them submit to any 
thing that can be bore with. If no body did Want no body would 
                                                                                                                                          
is paid in proportion to his Diligence, can do more work than another, who is paid by 
the Day or the Week, and has standing Wages” (Mandeville 1733). 
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work, but the greatest Hardships are look’d upon as solid Pleasures, 
when they keep a Man from Starving (Mandeville 1924b, 287).  
 
In order to preserve this condition of necessity, wages have to be 
kept low: “Who, if by four Days Labour in a Week they can maintain 
themselves, will hardly be persuaded to work the fifth; […] what reason 
have we to think that they would ever work, unless they were oblig’d to 
it by immediate Necessity?” (Mandeville 1924a, 192). This is why “the 
poor should be kept strictly to work, and that it was prudence to relieve 
their wants, but folly to cure them” (1924a, 248). Necessity thus seems 
to be the only way to force people to accept a life of sacrifice; 
furthermore, the working poor should “condescend” to accept an 
existence of hard work and deprivation.6  
Such claims appear to be at odds with the common understanding of 
Mandeville’s theory of human nature.7 For instance, one of the dominant 
human characteristics he emphasises is “the desire for more”, to fulfil 
needs, and to satisfy appetites; this cannot, it seems, be reconciled with 
voluntary and compliant submission to unending toil. Even when he 
discusses the rational ability of humans to govern their passions,8 he 
insists that what all humans ultimately seek is the satisfaction of their 
desires: “All Human Creatures are sway'd and wholly govern'd by their 
Passions, whatever fine Notions we may flatter our Selves with” 
(Mandeville 1732, 31). 
Mandeville seems to believe that humans seek satisfaction in every 
activity because they are dominated by passions, and that “all Passions 
center in Self-Love” (Mandeville 1924a, 75). Self-love is more than an 
instinct to preserve oneself. It can be seen to include the desire to be 
praised, and plays therefore a large role in governing human interaction 
(see Hjort 1991). In the Fable’s Part I, self-love shares much in common 
                                                
6 “It is impossible that a Society can long subsist, and suffer many of its Members to 
live in Idleness, and enjoy all the Ease and Pleasure they can invent, without having at 
the same time great Multitudes of People that to make good this Defect will 
condescend to be quite the reverse” (Mandeville 1924b, 286). 
7 It should be emphasised that it is not altogether clear if we can talk about 
Mandeville’s having a single, unfied, theory of human nature, even if this discussion is 
not the scope of this essay. One option for dealing with the apparent inconsistency is 
to accept that there is a lack of coherence in Mandeville’s writings that would give us 
reason to discuss him as a theorist of human nature (or a philosopher as such). This is 
implicitly assumed by many philosophers today.  
8 “Even those who act suitably to their Knowledge, and strictly follow the Dictates of 
their Reason, are not less compell'd so to do by some Passion or other, that sets them 
to Work, than others, who bid Defiance and act contrary to Both, and whom we call 
Slaves to their Passions” (Mandeville 1732, 31). 
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with pride (though, in Part II of the Fable, Mandeville distinguishes it 
from self-liking, which is a more refined passion) (Lovejoy 1971, 171; 
Dickey 1990, 399; Tolonen 2013, 84-95). Mandeville believed that all 
humans possess pride (even the working poor). He states:  
 
Pride is that Natural Faculty by which every Mortal that has any 
Understanding over-values, and imagines better Things of himself 
than any impartial Judge, thoroughly acquainted with all his 
Qualities and Circumstances, could allow him. We are possess’d of 
no other Quality so beneficial to Society, and so necessary to render 
it wealthy and flourishing as this (Mandeville 1924a, 124).  
 
Mandeville seemed to suggest that every human being has a desire 
to improve his own condition, and that this desire is the driver of 
human action. In Remark ‘M’, Mandeville does not appear to exclude 
anyone from the domain of this passion, not even simple workers:  
 
We all look above our selves, and, as fast as we can, strive to imitate 
those, that some way or other are superior to us. The poorest 
Labourer’s Wife in the Parish, who scorns to wear a strong wholesom 
Frize, as she might, will half starve her self and her Husband to 
purchase a second-hand Gown and Petticoat, that cannot do her half 
the Service; because, forsooth, it is more genteel. The Weaver, the 
Shoemaker, the Tailor, the Barber, and every mean working Fellow, 
that can set up with little, has the Impudence with the first Money he 
gets, to Dress himself like a Tradesman of Substance (1924a, 129). 
 
Passions, especially pride, seem to dominate all human actions. At 
first glance, there is no reason to believe that this does not apply to the 
working poor, who, unlike everyone else, work just for fulfilling their 
basic necessities. It is indeed true that Mandeville contemplates the 
possibility that people give up (some of) their passions at some point; 
but those who suppress their desires have other passion-driven aims 
instead. This led him to conclude that: “it is unreasonable to expect, that 
others should serve us for nothing” (Mandeville 1733, 349). Though, he 
never mentions the possibility that people voluntarily give up personal 
aspirations without hope for reward. His assumption about the 
innateness of pride permitted him to suggest that humans tend to value 
luxury over pleasure: the desire to possess things and to be admired will 
lead people to accept other deprivations. For example, women who want 
to look thinner and to fit in smaller clothes will deprive themselves of 
food (Mandeville 1924a). 
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If we consider that all human beings are ruled by passions, it seems 
quite unfair to suppose that persons will submit to hard work without 
reward (other than having basic needs met), and also dangerous for the 
maintenance of social order. Yet, elsewhere, Mandeville has expressed 
scepticism about the possibility that human passions can be subdued 
and even claims that it could be dangerous for social order. Most of 
these reflections concern the political dimension of social order: 
Mandeville defended the principle of liberty against the tyranny of 
absolute government. This was based on his assumption about human 
nature, according to which, every kind of forced submission is 
ultimately dangerous for the socio-political order. The way to build a 
peaceful society is not through the exercise of sovereign power, as it is 
impossible to control humans by force alone (1924a, 42). An obvious 
example of this is slavery: slaves cannot be trusted and will always try 
to rebel against their captors (Mandeville 1987, 307). Here Mandeville 
seems to be making a more general point beyond the mere idea of a 
government exercising power over its subjects. The point is that human 
nature cannot easily be modified, and that passions cannot easily be 
suffocated. Accordingly, those in power should not underestimate the 
power of human passions, and should not assume that they can be 
easily suppressed. In The Fable’s Part II he states that,  
 
There is great Difference between being submissive, and being 
governable; for he who barely submits to another, only embraces 
what he dislikes, to shun what he dislikes more; But to be 
governable, implies an Endeavour to please, and a Willingness to 
exert ourselves in behalf of the Person that governs. […] Therefore a 
Creature is then truly governable, when, reconcil’d to Submission, it 
has learn’d to construe his Servitude to his own Advantage; and 
rests satisfy’d with the Account it finds for itself, in the Labour it 
performs for others (Mandeville 1733, 184). 
 
Although the context of these claims is the maintenance of political 
order rather than the working condition of labourers, the subject is the 
same—it deals with the human passions. In the former context (the 
social/political order) Mandeville advises politicians not to assume that 
humans can be subdued by force alone because their passions are not 
easily suppressed. By contrast, with regard to labourers, the only way to 
make them accept deprivation and hard living conditions is to inculcate 
the necessity of working.  
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Nevertheless, Mandeville did not seem to consider fully that the 
ambitions and desires of poor people cannot be suppressed for long 
without threatening societal peace and order. Humans will never 
willingly submit to the will of others; at some point they will try to rebel. 
This was apparently clear to Mandeville concerning political issues. But, 
that the submission of poor people is just as likely to lead to unstable 
social conditions should have been clearer to him.  
 
Mandeville’s portrait of the poor: ignorant and happy? 
It is not obvious, then, why it can’t be assumed that the working poor 
would labour to earn more money, to achieve a comfortable lifestyle, 
and to improve their overall condition—this is what people typically do. 
Mandeville might have seen this objection and tried to respond to it, but 
the arguments he employs are problematic because of their 
inconsistency with his general line of thought. 
The first argument goes as follows: when Mandeville talks about 
pride, he claims that it is a faculty that belongs to “every Mortal that has 
any Understanding”. So perhaps his intuition was that without such 
“understanding” people would not display any signs of pride. Thus, if 
the working poor were kept away from charity schools (as sources of 
understanding), they would not become victims of this passion. It was 
for this reason that Mandeville stated that workers ought to be kept 
ignorant. He insisted that such ignorance guarantees a form of 
happiness that is possible only among the uneducated, and 
subsequently portrayed them in a way that closely resembles his idea of 
a savage in the state of nature. However, his attempt to prove that poor 
and ignorant people bound to hard work can be happy is not convincing 
and suffers from many inconsistencies. 
Mandeville was probably aware of how untenable his position was, 
and for this reason added the provision of ignorance:  
 
To make the Society happy and People easy under the meanest 
Circumstances, it is requisite that great Numbers of them should be 
Ignorant as well as Poor. Knowledge both enlarges and multiplies 
our Desires, and the fewer things a Man wishes for, the more easily 
his Necessities may be supply’d (Mandeville 1924b, 277-278).  
 
Mandeville criticized charity schools as a source of knowledge since 
the more a man “knows” the less he is likely to accept a life of 
deprivation. The small amount of knowledge the working poor would 
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gain at charity schools (such as the ability to read and write) would lead 
them to overestimate themselves (the same effect of pride), and thus to 
refuse to submit to hard work:  
 
Those who spent a great part of their Youth in learning to Read, 
Write and Cypher, expect and not unjustly to be employ’d where 
those Qualifications may be of use to them; the Generality of them 
will look upon downright Labour with the utmost Contempt, I mean 
Labour perform’d in the Service of others in the lowest Station of 
Life, and for the meanest Consideration (1924b, 289).  
 
Ignorance is therefore required for people to willingly submit to 
hard work. But it is not clear what Mandeville really meant when he talks 
about ignorance. Given that he wanted to support his claim about the 
harms of charity schools, it is possible that he simply referred to 
education. This is apparent in some passages, as he thinks that merely 
reading and writing can bring about damage. But, in other passages, he 
seems to refer to more than the kind of education one could learn at a 
charity school; it is a broader kind of knowledge, what he calls 
knowledge “of the world”, and also “understanding”. He writes that: 
  
the Knowledge of the Working Poor should be confin’d within the 
Verge of their Occupations, and never extended (as to things visible) 
beyond what relates to their Calling. The more a Shepherd, a 
Plowman or any other Peasant knows of the World, and the things 
that are Foreign to his Labour or Employment, the less fit he’ll be to 
go through the Fatigues and Hardships of it with Chearfulness and 
Content (1924b, 288). 
 
Later in the text, when commenting on the necessity of the 
“inferiority” of the servants, he clarifies that he means “Inferiors not 
only in Riches and Quality, but likewise in Knowledge and 
Understanding. A Servant can have no unfeign’d Respect for his Master, 
as soon as he has Sense enough to find out that he serves a Fool” 
(1924b, 289). 
Such arguments suggest that what Mandeville meant by keeping the 
poor ignorant went beyond the kind of education obtained in charity 
schools. The kind of ignorance that is required is not only lack of formal 
education, but also lack of “knowledge of the world”, and lack of 
understanding. Yet such conditions would not be met simply by closing 
charity schools; they would require a different conception of human 
nature.  
PONGIGLIONE & TOLONEN / MANDEVILLE ON CHARITY SCHOOLS 
 
ERASMUS JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 95 
Happiness is a central concept in Mandeville’s prose. He had insisted 
that charity schools are likely to make the children of the poor unhappy 
given that, upon being educated, children will have glimpsed a life they 
could not achieve. In this context, unhappiness seems thus to be 
strongly connected to education, and this is perhaps why Mandeville 
professed that poor people should be kept ignorant. Mandeville devoted 
much attention to the happiness of the poor in order to prove that poor 
people could be happy despite being mired in their lowly condition, 
unable to ameliorate it with education. What needed to be clarified is the 
kind of happiness the poor could achieve, and whether it would be true 
happiness. 
In medical and Epicurean terms, happiness is characterised as the 
absence of pain (be that mental or physical). For example, in the Fable of 
the bees Mandeville stated that, “those were the happiest, who felt the 
least pain” (Mandeville 1924a, 92). And, in the Preface to the Fable, 
Mandeville stated that, … 
 
if laying aside all worldly Greatness and Vain-Glory, I should be 
ask’d where I thought it was most probable thatMen might enjoy 
true Happiness, I would prefer a small peaceable Society, in which 
Men, neither envy’d nor esteem’d by Neighbours, should be 
contented to live upon the Natural Product of the Spot they inhabit 
(1924a, 12-13).  
 
Thus, in order to be happy it would have been better to be frugal 
and moderate in one’s passions: fewer wants and fewer passions lead to 
moderation and contentment.  
Mandeville aimed to show that poor people were able to enjoy as 
much happiness as the rich because they had different needs and 
passions. The poor man is content drinking beer whereas the middle-
class choice is more complex—e.g., he cannot decide between claret and 
port. The framework by which human nature is defined is fairly 
standard, but the poor and the rich differ with regard to the objects of 
their passions. Thus, even the poor could satisfy their passions, as they 
are described as  
 
soon contented as to the necessaries of Life; such as are glad to take 
up with the coursest Manufacture in every thing they wear, and in 
their Diet have no other aim than to feed their Bodies when their 
Stomachs prompt them to eat, and with little regard to Taste or 
Relish, refuse no wholesome Nourishment that can be 
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swallow’dwhen Men are Hungry, or ask any thing for their Thirst but 
to quench it (Mandeville 1924b, 286-287).  
 
The key to understanding this desire mechanism is as follows: poor 
people’s desires are different from those of the rich in that the objects 
of desire are more tangible. This is not to say that the poor and the rich 
are entirely different; but they do not appear to have similar desires 
(1924b, 311).9 This is a familiar argument put forward by all early 
modern writers, Christian and non-Christian alike: life’s necessities 
among people in higher positions of society compared with those on the 
lower levels were assumed to be different.  
Yet, it could be objected that, even if desires are different, the 
mechanism that drives the desire is the same, as Mandeville writes in 
the Remark ‘M’ (see above Mandeville 1924a, 129). This might be why 
Mandeville made the distinction between poor people and rich people, 
suggesting that they have ultimately different natures: “Excess of Vanity 
and hurtful Ambition are unknown among the Poor; they are seldom 
tainted with Avarice, with Irreligion never; and they have much less 
Opportunity of robbing the Publick than their Betters” (Mandeville 1733, 
60). Poor people are content with what they have, so long as they ignore 
the pleasures and luxury of the rich. One may find “Union and 
Neighbourly Love, less Wickedness and Attachment to the World, more 
Content of Mind, more Innocence, Sincerity” among the hard working 
and the illiterate, and “Pride and Insolence, eternal Quarrels and 
Dissensions, Irreconcilable Hatreds, Strife, Envy, Calumny and other 
Vices destructive to mutual Concord” among university-educated 
scholars (Mandeville 1924b, 309).  
The description of the poor Mandeville provided in Charity-schools 
resembles his description of man in the state of nature: the savage is a 
timorous rather than a voracious animal, characterised by “Innocence 
and Stupidity”; all the problems of the savage, as well as of the poor, 
arise from knowledge: “as his Knowledge increases, his Desires are 
enlarged (and consequently his Wants and Appetites are multiply’d)” 
(Mandeville 1924a, 205-206). 
                                                
9 “Abundance of hard and dirty labour is to be done, and coarse living is to be 
complied with: where shall we find a better nursery for these necessities than the 
children of the poor? none certainly are nearer to it or fitter for it. Besides that the 
things I called hardships, neither seem nor are such to those who have been brought 
up to ’em, and know no better. There is not a more contented people among us, than 
those who work the hardest and are the least acquainted with the pomp and delicacies 
of the world”. 
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There are, nevertheless, some problems with this description of poor 
people. First, contentment and innocence are not drivers of action: 
“Content, the Bane of Industry, / Makes ‘em admire their homely Store, / 
And neither seek nor covet more” (1924a, 35). If poor people are happy 
with their condition they have no reason to submit to hard work, and if 
they do it because they are guided by their passions and necessities, this 
is at odds with the idea of happiness and “contentment”. If poor people 
work in order to satisfy their passions and necessities they are thus just 
like everyone else in the world, and the fact that the passions are less 
refined does not change the mechanism behind it. 
It could be further argued that Mandeville actually had in mind a 
stoic idea of happiness, which meant that people could be happy in the 
worst conditions—i.e., hard work, low salary, simple food, no luxury. 
This is a recurrent theme in Mandeville’s work. The Stoics indeed did 
not…  
 
allow any Thing to be a real Good that was liable to be taken from 
them by others. They wisely consider’d the Instability of Fortune, 
and the Favour of Princes; the Vanity of Honour, and popular 
Applause; the Precariousness of Riches, and all earthly Possessions; 
and therefore placed true Happiness in the calm Serenity of a 
contented Mind free from Guilt and Ambition (1924a, 150).  
 
This is not only found in the Stoics, as Mandeville states: “the 
generality of Wise Men that have liv’d ever since to this Day, agree with 
the Stoicks in the most material Points; as that there can be no true 
Felicity in what depends on Things perishable” (1924a, 151). 
But, the working poor are excluded from such happiness. As such, 
the Stoics could be happy in spite of what befalls them, their force is in 
their mind: “the generality of Wise Men […] agree with the Stoicks […] 
that Knowledge, Temperance, Fortitude, Humility, and other 
Embellishments of the Mind are the most valuable Acquisitions” (1924a, 
151). Thus, while the stoic is a wise man, the working poor is ignorant; 
while the stoic has knowledge on his side, the working poor has to be 
kept away from it at all costs; while the stoic commands his passions, 
the working poor has fewer passions, but does not command them—the 
necessity to satisfy at least some of them is what makes him work hard. 
The stoic is superior to others, the working poor needs to be inferior. 
It could thus be stated that Mandeville’s claim that poor people are 
happy does not hold. Even supposing that the poor are similar to 
savages, they could never enjoy the same happiness and contentment, 
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as they are virtually enslaved by the rich, but lack the intellectual 
resources that would allow them to be happy even with such 
deprivations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The aim in this paper was to explore Mandeville’s highly criticised Essay 
on charity and charity-schools in order to establish what was valuable 
and reasonable therein, and what, even if less topical from a 
contemporary perspective, was problematic about his mercantilist 
background.  
Despite some interesting elements, Mandeville’s attempts to justify 
his views are not entirely convincing. Although it may well be that 
charity schools did not make poor people happy, and may have been 
detrimental to their wellbeing, the working conditions Mandeville 
proposed would have had no chance of generating a happy working 
class. On the other hand, the idea of teaching job skills instead of Latin, 
and focusing on employment rather than education makes some sense. 
The main problem is Mandeville’s notion of necessity: In lacking basic 
needs and being dependent upon hard labour for low wages, the poor 
are more likely to experience civil unrest than “national happiness”—
Mandeville seemed to understand this given his explanation of the 
difference between submission and governability. 
Yet, the idea of keeping the poor ignorant so as to subdue their 
passions and keep their happiness intact is inconsistent. This is for two 
reasons: Firstly, Mandeville’s idea of ignorance does not seem to be 
confined to formal education, but rather to a general “knowledge of the 
world” and “understanding”. But such forms of ignorance cannot be 
achieved by the mere abolition of charity schools. Rather, they require 
the presence of a different kind of human being, which he indeed 
theorizes about. However, the portrait of the poor person he conceives, 
which is very similar to his notion of the primitive savage, is again 
inconsistent with his ideas about happiness. Even the Stoic ideal of 
happiness cannot apply to the poor, since the Stoic’s wisdom and 
superior knowledge allow him to feel happy despite his poor material 
conditions. Mandeville’s ideal poor person, being ignorant and savage-
like, cannot aspire to reach this kind of happiness.  
In conclusion, Mandeville probably deserved the criticism his essay 
attracted, but more for the inner inconsistencies in his arguments than 
for his attack on the virtue of charity and charity schools. As he points 
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out, such institutions were probably far from a good solution to the 
problem of poverty. 
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